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Red-Teaming NLW: A Top Ten 
List of Criticisms about Non-
Lethal Weapons 
David A. Koplow 1 
Critics of non-lethal weapons (NLW) have asserted 
numerous complaints about the concepts, the Department of 
Defense research and development efforts, and the pace of 
innovation in the field.  These critiques challenge the cost of the 
programs, their consistency with international law, the adverse 
public reaction to some of the devices, and the dangers of 
proliferation, among other points.  This article summarizes the 
various assessments, in form of a “top ten list” of criticisms, 
and evaluates their weight.  The author concludes that some of 
these points of objection have merit, but overall, the NLW 
enterprise is worthy of continuation and even expansion, to 
meet more fully its ambitious goals. 
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I. Introduction 
The concept and practice of non-lethal weapons (NLW) is no 
longer a new and fledgling enterprise. U.S. Marine Corps Lt. Gen. 
Anthony Zinni’s famous invocation of NLW to assist in covering the 
withdrawal of United Nations forces from Somalia occurred way back 
in 1995.2 Directive 3000.3, the foundational charter for the U.S. 
Department of Defense (DoD) engagement in the field, was issued in 
1996.3 The Joint Directorate, the organizational sanctum supporting 
the Pentagon’s day-to-day research and development in the field, 
stood up in 1997.4 
This makes NLW a twenty-year-old campaign. Measured another 
way, 1995 was two or three wars ago. And, of course, many of the 
relevant technologies and devices trace their lineage back much 
further. Conversely, many other familiar institutions and social 
phenomena that modern society considers mature and well established 
are younger than NLW. The Toyota Prius, for example, debuted in 
1997,5 as did the first Apple online store.6 Nintendo released the 
Nintendo 64 video game system 1996.7 Of local interest, the re-birth 
of the current Cleveland Browns came in 1999.8 Even Pokémon, 
 
2. Dwight Jon Zimmerman, The Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program, DEF. 
MEDIA NETWORK (Dec. 1, 2010), http:// www. defensemedianetwork. 
com/stories/the-joint-non-lethal-weapons-program/ (describing Lt. Gen. 
Anthony Zinni’s innovative exploitation of NLW in Somalia, to protect 
the withdrawal of United Nations personnel without further inciting 
local opposition). 
3. DoD Executive Agent for Non-Lethal Weapons (NLW) and NLW 
Policy, DoD Directive 3000.03E (Apr. 25, 2013), originally issued as 
Policy for Non-Lethal Weapons, DoD Directive 3000.3 (Jul. 9, 1996). 
4. History, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. NON-LETHAL WEAPONS PROG., http:// 
jnlwp.defense.gov/About/History.aspx (last visited Mar. 4, 2015).  
5. Toyota Prius 1997-2004, AUTOEVOLUTION, http:// www. autoevolution. 
com/ cars/ toyota- prius- 1997. html #aeng_toyota-prius -2000-15 
(indicating that the Toyota Prius’s initial introduction was in Japan in 
1997, while its global introduction was in 2001) (last visited Mar. 4, 
2015).  
6. Daniel Eran Dilger, The next ten years of Apple Retail, APPLEINSIDER 
(Jan. 5, 2012, 09:41 AM), http:// appleinsider.com/ articles/ 12/01/ 
05/the_next_ten_years_of_apple_retail.  
7. Chris Scullion, History of Nintendo: N64, OFFICIAL NINTENDO MAG. 
(Oct. 28, 2009), http://www.officialnintendomagazine.co.uk/12769/ 
features/history-of-nintendo-n64/.  
8. Thomas George, PRO FOOTBALL; The Old Becomes New as Browns 
are Reborn, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 1999), http:// www.nytimes.com/ 
1999/08/09/sports/pro-football-the-old-becomes-new-as-browns-are-
reborn.html.  
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unleashed in 1996, is as old as NLW.9  Thus, it has been long enough 
since the birth of NLW that it is now appropriate to undertake some 
serious, even skeptical, appraisal of the program and its constituent 
elements. The underlying theories and the programmatic features are 
now sufficiently strong and well established to be able to endure 
tough scrutiny. 
One version of that searching analysis is red-teaming, trying to 
construct the strongest possible case against NLW, as a form of high-
stakes testing. As an avid supporter of NLW, I am especially 
interested in exploring how well the program—its history, current 
status, and anticipated future directions—can stand up to this type of 
audit, as well as contemplating what rebuttals to the critiques may be 
persuasive. To begin this red-teaming, I have prepared a Top Ten 
List of objections, doubts, and concerns about NLW. I hope that a 
review of this roster of complaints can inspire a focused, even-handed 
appraisal of the overall pros and cons of the NLW enterprise. 
II. Non-Lethal Weapons Complaints 
1. NLW Technology is Still Largely a Capability in Search of a Mission 
To date, there really has been no great demand for NLW. 
Customers are not eagerly lining up to procure the products. The 
overwhelming function of the military remains “to kill people and 
break things,” and if the bad guys continue to shoot live munitions at 
us, then the good guys will need to return fire with ordnance that is 
as lethal as possible.10 Both force protection and mission 
accomplishment demand the traditional accoutrements of military 
operations; NLW will, at best, occupy a boutique niche. Even if 
civilians are present—which is the situation in which NLW would 
ordinarily be of greatest application—deadly force is typically still 
necessary and appropriate as a means of self-defense. The array of 
NLW capabilities, present and future, designed to fill a gap “between 
bullhorns and bullets,” is basically a solution to a nearly non-existent 
problem. Almost always, bullhorns or bullets will be both necessary 
and sufficient.11 
 
9. See Glenn Rose, Pokémon Is Back, MARLIN CHRONICLE, Oct. 29, 2013, 
http://marlinchronicle.vwc.edu//?p=1140.  
10. Bob Wilson, The Purpose of a Military is to Kill People and Break 
Things, ETHICAL SPECTACLE,  http:// www.spectacle.org/298/ wilmine. 
html (last visited Nov. 3, 2014).  
11. See Lt. Col. Jesse Galvan & Maj. Theo Kang, The Future of the Army 
Nonlethal Scalable Effects Center, MIL. POLICE, Apr. 2006, at 4, 4, 
available at http://www.wood.army.mil/mpbulletin/pdfs/pb19-06-1.pdf.  
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2. NLW Technology is Developing Too Slowly 
Despite the best, and quite admirable, efforts of the Joint Non-
Lethal Weapons Directorate (JNLWD),  the military services, and  a 
small but growing armada of contractors in the nascent non-lethal 
military-industrial complex, there is still not enough there there. The 
requisite inventiveness, and the capacity to carry new capabilities into 
operation, have been in short supply. As one indicator, the current 
JNLWD annual report12 is remarkably similar to its forebearers  from 
five or ten years ago in describing the array of currently available 
technologies (which are still relatively modest) and in forecasting the 
more adventuresome future systems (which are seemingly not getting 
much closer to operability.) Some of the fact sheets, describing 
particular types of NLW programs, likewise reflect only incremental 
year-to-year editing, conveying a distressing suggestion that progress 
in NLW occurs at only a glacial pace.13   
As an example of this perceived lethargy in development, there is 
currently no NLW that can effectively but safely address problems 
with groups of people at a distance of more than a few meters. Blunt 
trauma projectiles, tasers, and vehicle-arresting barriers are fine, but 
if these are the only products to come out of the creativity of the 
NLW sector, then the game is not changing fast enough. Perhaps this 
is a case of simply getting what you pay for. When the budget for 
NLW programs hovers around $140 million annually, a paltry sum by 
 
12. Compare U.S. DEF. DEP’T, NON-LETHAL WEAPONS ANNUAL REVIEW 6 
(2013) [hereinafter JNLWD 2013 REV.], available at http:// 
jnlwp.defense.gov/Portals/50/Documents/Press_Room/Annual_Review
s_Reports/2013/DoD_Non-Lethal_ Weapons_ Program_Annual_ 
Review_11.19.2012_HTML_format_v1.pdf  (describing “[l]ow-energy 
dazzling lasers” as current technology in 2013 providing “discrete, non-
verbal hailing and warning signals.” with U.S. DEF. DEP’T, NON-LETHAL 
WEAPONS ANNUAL REVIEW 10 (2010), available at http:// jnlwp.defense. 
gov/Portals/50/Documents/Press_Room/Annual_Reviews_Reports/20
10_2011/2010_Annual_Report_Final_PDF.pdf (describing “dazzling 
lasers” as current technology in 2011 providing “discrete, non-verbal 
warning signals”), and Staff Sgt. Will Skelton, Active Denial System 
Demonstrated for Department of Defense Leadership and News Media, 
U.S. DEP’T DEF. NON-LETHAL WEAPONS PROGRAM NEWSL. (Joint Non-
Lethal Weapons Dir. Quantico, Va.), June 2012, at 4, available at 
http://jnlwp.defense.gov/Portals/50/Documents/Press_Room/Newslett
ers/Newsletter_053112.pdf (describing the Active Denial System as a 
millimeter-wave system as the system of the future).  
13. See Non-Lethal Weapons Requirements Fact Sheet, JOINT NON-LETHAL 
WEAPONS PROG. (Oct. 2011), http://jnlwp.defense.gov/ Portals/50/ 
Documents/Press_Room/Fact_Sheets/NLWR_Fact_Sheet_Oct_2011.
pdf (describing the need for, and progress in, non-lethal weapons 
development). 
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Pentagon standards, NLW will not experience many revolutionary 
advances.14 
3. Public Opinion, in the United States and Elsewhere, Has Not Warmed 
to NLW 
The most interesting and promising development among NLW is 
the Active Denial System (ADS), a novel millimeter “heat wave” 
mechanism for dispersing crowds at standoff distances.15 This device  
carries enormous potential for constructive application in all sorts of 
mixed civilian and military situations; it really would be something 
new under the sun.16 ADS was incrementally developed and 
thoroughly tested over a period of a decade; it is a proven 
technology.17 DoD deployed ADS  to Afghanistan, but never used it.18 
Why not? Was it because the administrators feared that the media 
coverage of its use would make it look too inhumane, too futuristic, 
too scary, or just too weird? If so, that is a terrible, but perhaps 
representative, illustration of excessive timidity surrounding the 
employment of new technologies that might provoke adverse public 
reactions. Sometimes, as with remotely piloted vehicles (weaponized 
drones) and stealth technology, for example, DoD has been willing to 
pay the price of that “CNN effect”;19 but, thus far,  DoD has not 
expressed a similar assertiveness when it comes to NLW. 
 
14. JNLWD 2013 REV., supra note 11, at 4. 
15. Active Denial Technology Fact Sheet, U.S. DEF. DEP’T NON-LETHAL 
WEAPONS PROG. (Aug. 14, 2013), http://jnlwp. defense. gov/PressRoom 
/FactSheets/ArticleView/tabid/4782/Article/4047/active-denial-
technology-fact-sheet.aspx.  
16. See, e.g., Noah Shachtman, Pain Ray, Rejected by the Military, Ready 
to Blast L.A. Prisoners, WIRED (Aug. 24, 2010, 3:02 PM), 
http://www.wired.com/2010/08/pain-ray-rejected-by-the-military-ready-
to-blast-l-a-prisoners/ (describing how and why the Los Angeles County 
Sheriff’s Department purchased ADS systems brought back from 
Afghanistan for crowd control use in at least one LACSD detention 
center). 
17. See Brian Bergstein, Military’s Energy-Beam Weapons Delayed, USA 
TODAY (Jul. 9, 2005), http:// usatoday30.usatoday.com/ news/ 
nation/2005-07-09-army-weapons_x.htm?csp=34 (stating that the U.S. 
military has analyzed the effects of ADS for decades, and has worked on 
the current ADS system since 1994). 
18. Shane McGlaun, U.S. Military Demonstrates “Active Denial System” 
Non-Lethal Weapon, DAILYTECH (Mar. 12, 2012, 10:22 AM), http:// 
www.dailytech.com/US+Military+Demonstrates+Active+Denial+Syste
m+NonLethal+Weapon+/article24208.htm.  
19. See Eytan Gilboa, The CNN Effect: The Search for a Communication 
Theory of International Relations, 22 POL. COMM. 27, 34–37 (analyzing 
how various studies into the effect of media coverage of actions or 
inactions demonstrate that the media may be able to influence tactical 
decisions, such as the protection of certain threatened groups in the 
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4. Costs and Logistics Demands are Excessive 
Some NLW are, or soon can be, available as commercial off-the-
shelf products, so cost and prompt availability should not be major 
problems. But even then,   DoD still needs to adapt and improve the 
tools  to ensure that they are battlefield rugged and compatible with 
other standard-issue equipment. That process can become costly, 
especially when  DoD is, admirably, committed to such thorough 
human effects testing upon which other customers might not insist.20 
Other, more path breaking NLW can be quite pricey. In a tight 
budgetary environment, NLW research, development, and 
procurement compete with pursuit of cyber, robotics, and other 
innovations where the payoff seems quicker and more dramatic. 
Moreover, the logistics tail of NLW may become an important 
deterrent. If the military has to procure both NLW and its standard 
complement of equipment, train its force on both categories of 
weapons, store and transport both, and carry both into action, the 
sum of all these support operations  can be an impressive burden. It 
might be that an infantryman on patrol encounters a particular 
situation in which access to a specified NLW would be advantageous, 
but how much weight and volume can he carry on that patrol? If he 
has to pick only a limited quantity of items, he will naturally favor 
the deadly tools and leave the NLW behind.21 
 
former Yugoslavia, but are less influential in determining the strategic 
decisions of a country or coalition in a particular situation, such as in 
Rwanda). 
20. Non-Lethal Weapons (NLW) Human Effects Characterization, DoD 
Instruction 3200.19 (May 17, 2012), available at http://www. dtic.mil/ 
whs/directives/corres/pdf/320019p.pdf. 
21. Philip Bulman, Police Use of Force: The Impact of Less-Lethal 
Weapons and Tactics, 267 NAT’L INST. JUST. J. 4, 7–8. An additional 
issue, which could in the future become an eleventh point for this 
article’s list, is the danger that U.S. development and deployment of 
advanced NLW might impede effective coalition operations, if allies (in 
NATO or elsewhere) were not similarly equipped and trained. The 
United States has addressed this potential issue by collaborating with 
NATO allies in the pursuit of NLW, but it is not clear how vigorous 
other countries have been in fielding the relevant capabilities. See, e.g., 
Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate Participates in NATO Non-
Lethal Weapons Experiment and Demonstration, U.S. DEF. DEP’T NON-
LETHAL WEAPONS PROG. (Mar. 8, 2011), http:// jnlwp. defense.gov/ 
PressRoom/MediaReleases/tabid/4778/Article/577945/joint-non-lethal-
weapons-directorate-participates-in-nato-non-lethal-weapons-ex.aspx 
(describing the REAL DEAL experiments run by NATO to demonstrate 
NLW developed by the JNLWD). 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 47 (2015) 
Red-Teaming NLW 
235 
5. International Law Impedes Use of Some NLW 
Some emerging NLW technologies—acoustic wave systems and 
ADS, for example—are designed to affect a large group of people 
simultaneously.22 The concept is to drive away or disable the faint of 
heart, so that armed forces can identify the real, determined 
troublemakers, separate them from the innocent onlookers, and deal 
more forcefully with the actual threats.23 However, the law of armed 
conflict forbids targeting civilians, and it requires “distinction” by 
treating non-combatants differently from belligerents.24 The 
application of wide-area, deliberately indiscriminate force fits 
uncomfortably within the law. 
Likewise, the application of chemical substances, such as riot 
control agents or potential calmative agents, would be barred from 
use in war by the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention,25 and their 
hypothetical use in “military operations other than war” has 
appropriately been circumscribed as a prudential matter. The 1972 
Biological Weapons Conventions even more comprehensively bars the 
use of conceivable biological agents, such as microbes that could 
attack enemy petroleum supplies or rubber tires and gaskets.26 Most 
 
22. See, e.g., David Greig, The Long Range Acoustic Device: Pirate 
Deterrent, Crowd Controller or Soft Drink Seller?, GIZMAG (Apr. 10, 
2009), http://www.gizmag.com/lrad-long-range-acoustic-device/11433/ 
(describing a 2009 incident in which a cruise ship used a Long-Range 
Acoustic Device, a device somewhat similar to ADS, to deter a Somali 
pirate attack).  
23. See Lt. Col. Erik. L. Nutley, Non-Lethal Weapons: Setting Our Phasers 
to Stun? Potential Strategic Blessings and Curses of Non-Lethal 
Weapons on the Battlefield 20 (Air War Coll. Ctr. for Strat. & Tech. 
Occ. Paper 34, 2003), available at http:// www.au.af.mil/ au/awc/ 
awcgate/cst/csat34.pdf (discussing, inter alia, “concept exploration 
programs” for non-lethal weapons systems that include the U.S. Army’s 
“Crowd Control” system that can “dispers[e] a crowd at ranges up to 
1,000 meters, and direc[t] a crowd[‘s] movement, separating belligerents, 
and isolating specific individuals within a crowd.”). 
24. See Customary IHL—Practice Relating to Rule 1. The Principle of 
Distinction between Civilians and Combatants, INT’L COMM. RED CROSS 
[ICRC] (2015), https://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/ v1_ rul_ 
rule1 (discussing the history and application of the principle of 
distinction). 
25. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, 
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction art. 
I(5), opened for signature Jan. 13, 1993, 1974 U.N.T.S. 45. 
26. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and 
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on 
Their Destruction art. I(1), opened for signature Apr. 10, 1972, 1015 
U.N.T.S. 163. 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 47 (2015) 
Red-Teaming NLW 
236 
NLW occupy space unconstrained by these treaties, but the treaties 
do bear upon some of the most intriguing possibilities.27 
6. NLW May Make Us Tactically Too Quick on the Trigger 
Sometimes, the most appropriate weapon is no weapon at all. 
Don’t just “do something”; stand there. Talk, smile, negotiate, walk 
away, or just wait. By affording police or the military a less hostile 
alternative to traditional firepower, NLW may encourage our forces to 
act precipitously, when the wiser course of action might actually be 
self-restraint. A telling example of the value of doing nothing is the 
conspicuous precedent of the sheriff’s department of Orange County, 
Fla. that equipped all of its officers with tasers. The first effect was an 
expected and dramatic reduction in the frequency of the officers’ use 
of deadly force. However, the second effect was an equally dramatic 
increase in the incidence of use of force overall, suggesting that police 
officers became quicker on the trigger when the adverse consequences 
of shooting first, and asking questions later, were mitigated.28 
7. NLW May Make Us Strategically Too Prone to Foreign Interventions 
At the senior political levels, the allure of NLW might lull 
national leaders with an illusion of cheap, bloodless military 
operations. They might be drawn into an engagement with the 
expectation that NLW could allow the intervention to remain 
entirely, or at least largely, safe and humane. In fact, however, any 
such illusion cannot be sustained. NLW are not entirely non-lethal,29 
and any military operation can cascade into a deadly confrontation 
that the country might regret. In general, any time a new technology 
promises to reduce the adverse consequences of a particular course of 
action, the public should expect to see more exercise of that course of 
action, even if it still turns out to be undesirable. 
 
27. See DoD Directive 3000.03E, supra note 2. An additional legal 
consideration is the possibility that if NLW do work as well as 
advertised, international and domestic U.S. law might eventually require 
that those capabilities be exercised first in any confrontation, rather 
than jumping immediately to the use of lethal force. U.S. policy denies 
that thesis, asserting that the availability of NLW does not imply any 
requirement to use them first, and does not raise the threshold for the 
application of deadly force.  Id., at ¶¶ 3(g), (h). But the law may 
nonetheless evolve in that direction. 
28. See Alex Berenson, As Police Use of Tasers Soars, Questions Over 
Safety Emerge, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 18, 2004), http:// www.nytimes. 
com/2004/07/18/us/as-police-use-of-tasers-soars-questions-over-safety-
emerge.html. 
29. Recognizing that no weapon can reliably be considered entirely non-
lethal, the Department of Defense specifies that NLW are intended to 
“minimize,” rather than to eliminate, fatalities and permanent injuries. 
DoD Directive 3000.03E, supra note 2, at ¶¶ 2(a)(3), 3(e). 
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8. Our Use of NLW May Embolden Opponents 
When adversaries face the prospect of the U.S. military using 
deadly force, they will be sensibly deterred from most confrontations. 
If, however, they were confident that the worst consequences that 
might befall them would be infliction of a bruise, nausea, or pain, 
they may gain a reinforced will to resist.30 No one would ever consider 
the U.S. Marine Corps or domestic SWAT teams wimpy, even if fully 
outfitted with NLW, but even a slight reputation for gentleness can 
reduce the currently fearsome power of dissuasion. 
9. NLW Technology Will Proliferate to Foreign Militaries and Be Used 
Against Us 
Wise military strategy has to contemplate not only the first move 
(such as the U.S. adoption of various NLW), but the subsequent 
moves as well, including the readily foreseeable adaptation by 
opponents. If NLW are helpful in aiding U.S. forces in accomplishing 
a mission, then other states may come to appreciate those virtues as 
well, whether now or in the future. It is far from clear that a future 
battlefield bristling on each side with both NLW and deadly weapons 
would automatically work to the advantage of the United States. In 
like manner, terrorists might become leading beneficiaries of a NLW 
revolution. Imagine how the ability to seize and hold hostages or to 
hijack aircraft could be augmented by some of the disabling 
technologies now within reach. 
10. NLW Technology Will Spread to Other Bad Actors 
The nature of technology is to spread; NLW capabilities will 
inevitably bleed into non-military sectors, probably sooner rather than 
later. Already, street criminals have been drawn to stun guns and 
pepper spray.31 Imagine what they could do with commercially 
available or black-market sticky foam or acoustic weapons. Another 
invidious market would be human rights abusers, who could see a 
knock-off ADS as a mechanism for inflicting excruciating pain upon 
political dissidents or other disfavored groups, without leaving telltale 
external scars that subsequent human rights monitors could detect 
and document.32  
30. Gilbert Geis & Arnold Binder, Non-Lethal Weapons: The Potential and 
the Pitfalls, 6 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 1, 5 (1990). 
31. See Eugene Volokh, Nonlethal Self-Defense, (Almost Entirely) Nonlethal 
Weapons, and the Right to Keep and Bear Arms and Defend Life, 62 
STAN. L. REV. 199, 209. 
32. See PHYS. FOR HUM. RTS., WEAPONIZING TEAR GAS: BAHRAIN’S 
UNPRECEDENTED USE OF TOXIC CHEMICAL AGENTS AGAINST CIVILIANS 
25 (2012), available at https:// s3.amazonaws.com/ PHR_Reports/ 
Bahrain-TearGas-Aug2012-small.pdf (describing the weaponized use of 
tear gas in Bahrain in 2012).  
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III. Conclusion 
Personally, I do not believe all these critiques. I think that there 
are adequate, or at least partial, responses to each complaint. 
However, NLW advocates should be careful not to over promise about 
the suitability or performance of NLW. No weapon, or family of 
weapons, is perfect or suitable for all types of engagements. At best, 
NLW offers a set of alternative tools rather than a magic wand.  
What should occur at this point is a more vigorous and better 
funded pursuit of NLW, as well as more operation and application of 
capabilities, such as ADS, in the field by military and police. The 
Department of Defense should be more ambitious in exploring NLW 
and bolder in fielding them. NLW deserve to be put more fully to the 
test in actual field operations.  
I hope that this red-team analysis, and the rebuttals and 
counterarguments it may stimulate, will help advance the further 
funding, development, and deployment of NLW in police situations 
and armed conflicts. 
 
